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Governments that suffer low levels of citizen trust generally have worse policy outcomes 
and less citizen compliance, making it difficult to pursue other policy goals. However, 
scholarship on government trust in low trust environments and how to improve trust is limited. In 
this paper, I propose that successful infrastructure development projects within a single country, 
because they are a uniquely visible government policy, serve to increase citizen trust in 
government. Using data from the Luz Para Todos program in Brazil, which is a federal program 
that provides electricity to households that lack it, I examine the effects of this particular 
infrastructure development program on blank voting rates, which are associated with trust in 
government. I expected find that municipalities with more recipients of the Luz Para Todos 
program will have higher trust in government. I also expected this relationship to have both 
spatial and temporal components. While one measure of trust supported these hypotheses, an 
alternative measure of trust did not, leaving mixed results for the relationship between 
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 Even in countries where governments are smaller or less effective, government actions 
affect the lives of citizens regularly. They deliver a variety of services and enforce a spectrum of 
regulations. There are many necessary ingredients for this apparatus to run smoothly, one of 
which is citizen trust in government. When citizens exhibit greater trust in government, they are 
more likely to comply with regulations and exhibit greater social trust and cooperation (Levi and 
Stoker 2000). Further, the ability of governments to pursue certain policy avenues is contingent 
on citizen trust (Heinemann and Tanz 2008). 
 Yet many governments do not enjoy high levels of citizen trust. For example, Brazil, the 
case study of this paper, suffers from low trust in government (Seligson 2002). Because 
scholarship on trust in government has been mostly applied to the United States and some 
democracies in Western Europe, analysis of trust in government has been relatively limited in 
Brazil and in Latin America more generally. Further, frameworks for understanding trust were 
developed for relatively high-trust environments. In particular, one framework for understanding 
trust in government is a transactive model, where a citizen is understood to trust their 
government if they believe that the government has “the integrity and capacity to meet voters’ 
expectations” (Keele 2007). That is, when governments perform key tasks well, such as 
economic stewardship, citizen trust increases as a result.   
 In this paper, I seek to apply this framework of trust to Brazil to see if it can explain trust 
in government in a low trust environment. In particular, I will examine whether good 
performance on infrastructure development will increase citizen trust in government. I focus on 
infrastructure development because it is a government action that is uniquely visible. When 
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governments complete an infrastructure development project, laypeople are able to directly see 
the project and judge it for themselves. Consider the completion of a highway. Citizens are able 
to drive on the highway and judge the quality of the road and various other aspects of the project 
without specialized knowledge. Further, largescale infrastructure projects are typically promoted 
heavily so citizens are likely to be aware of them. 
I will use implementation data from the Luz Para Todos program to measure 
infrastructure development. The Luz Para Todos program is a federal initiative to achieve 
universal electrification in Brazil. The program has not suffered accusations of mismanagement 
or corruption and has been linked to improved economic development and improvements on all 
components of the Human Development Index (da Silveira Bezerra, et al. 2017). Because of the 
positive outcomes associated with the Luz Para Todos program, in particular to improvements to 
economic development and quality of life, it is a suitable candidate for evaluating the impact of 
positive action from the government on citizen trust in government. 
 The goal of this paper is thus to investigate the effect of a positive infrastructure project 
on citizen trust in government in order to test whether the transactive model of trust is applicable 
in a low trust environment. Because the Luz Para Todos program has implementation at the 
municipal level, that is the level of aggregation I will be studying the proposed relationship. I 
will first test whether a relationship exists between the infrastructure development and trust in 
government. I will then consider how this relationship varies over time and space. 
 In the first part of this paper, I examine the relevant literature on citizen trust in 
government and infrastructure development. I then present my theoretical arguments, data, and 
methods. I present results for two different measures of trust in government as well as alternative 
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model specifications. Finally, I provide a discussion of those results and recommendations for 
further research.   
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1. BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
1.1 Literature Review 
1.1.1 Trust in Government 
The existing literature on trust in government is extensive but mostly limited to countries 
in Western Europe and the United States where trust is relatively high (Putnam 2000, Newton 
2001, Keele 2007). In this context, there are two prevailing explanatory factors for variations in 
trust across time and between countries which reflect two different understandings of trust in 
government. The first is the eminent theory of social capital, which has inspired countless 
research projects. Social capital theory has greater explanatory power over the understanding of 
trust as a longer-term general regard for the government. Putnam (2000) defines social capital as 
the formal and informal networks that people in a society participate in that generate social trust, 
such as church membership, volunteer and community organizations, and family networks. His 
argument is that this social capital will help generate political trust and that social capital 
facilitated stronger political institutions and trust in northern Italy, compared with southern Italy, 
where social capital is low (Putnam, et al. 1994). Putnam provides further evidence for this 
assertion in his analysis of political trust in the United States. He argues that the decline in social 
capital seen in the United States since the 1950s can explain the declining political trust that also 
occurred during this period (Putnam, 2000). Like other trust in government literature, the focus 
of Putnam’s work has largely been focused on relatively high-trust OECD countries such as the 
United States. At first glance, this seems to extend to Latin American countries, as both social 
capital and political trust there are low. Brazil in particular suffers from both low social capital 
and low trust in government, so building trust in government cannot be developed from a base of 
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social capital (Newton, 2001). If social capital is not an available base to build political trust 
from, then low social capital countries need to build trust via other methods.  
However, Putnam’s work on social capital is largely deterministic and based on existing 
social structures and historical events, with little room for a short-term or even medium-term 
improvements. For example, he goes so far as to trace social patterns from early medieval Italy 
to explain the differences in institutional performance and social capital in different parts of Italy 
in the late 20th century (Putnam, et al. 1994). While it seems uncontroversial that history should 
play a role in social capital and government trust, this is a rather bleak picture for governments 
wishing to improve present-day citizen trust in government. He also finds that socioeconomic 
development did not improve social capital, but rather that social capital improved 
socioeconomic development (Putnam, et al. 1994). This raises the question of how governments 
can improve social capital if not through socioeconomic development.  
The second explanation for variations of trust in government provides more opportunities 
for governments to improve citizen trust in government. It is based on an evaluative conception 
of trust. This understanding of trust was historically popular in the literature and is articulated in 
Keele (2007) where a citizen is understood to trust their government when they believe that the 
government has the “integrity and capacity to meet the voter’s expectations.” This understanding 
of trust in government is transactive, where citizens extend trust as a reward for governments 
meeting expectations on key metrics, provides a route to improving trust in government without 
relying on pre-existing conditions like social capital. If the Brazilian government is looking to 
build trust in itself, it must prove to its citizenry that it can successfully steward the country. 
Based on findings in relatively high-trust countries like the United States, while there is support 
for social capital theory, a more transactive view of government performance also have a 
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measurable effect on trust in government. Economic performance, crime, corruption, and 
scandals are the key events that citizens use to evaluate government performance (Keele, 2007). 
In other words, if governments perform well on these metrics, there is an associated measurable 
increase in trust in government. This paper attempts to address a gap in the literature by testing 
whether government performance also influences trust in government outside of countries that 
have an established base of social and political trust.  
1.1.2 Benefits of Trust – Why Is It Worth the Hassle? 
Developing trust is a rather nebulous concern when compared with more concrete policy 
goals like poverty relief programs or increasing national security. Governments might wonder, 
justifiably, if identifying ways to increase trust in government is a worthwhile goal. Trust is 
however, a worthwhile goal, as many scholars have linked trust in government with improved 
outcomes of other government policies. For example, Heinemann and Tanz (2008) argue that a 
government’s ability to make certain economic reforms and adapt to changing economic 
conditions hinges on citizen trust in the government, with more trust giving the government more 
leeway to create public policy. In particular, they argue that trust facilitates the implementation 
of policies that deal with legal reforms, involvement of the government in the private economy, 
and deregulations of labor markets and private businesses (Heinemann and Tanz 2008). Citizens 
also exhibit certain behaviors associated with trust in government that help ensure a functioning 
society. For example, higher trust in government has been linked to greater citizen compliance 
on issues such as regulation and tax compliance (Levi and Stoker 2000). These results are 
representative of a broader theme in the literature that links citizen trust in government with 
better policy implementation results. If governments seek to accomplish other goals, enhancing 
citizen trust in government will make those other goals easier to accomplish. Methods to enhance 
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trust in government are thus an important goal for low trust environments. In Brazil in particular, 
where institutional reform has been an important policy issue in the past several years, improving 
trust could help the accomplish some of these reforms. Thus, governments that have low trust 
have a concrete interest in increasing citizen trust in government.  
1.1.3 Trust in Latin America  
Brazil, like most Latin American countries, has fairly low trust in government (Seligson 
2002). Of the indicators citizens use to evaluate government performance in high-trust nations, 
Latin American countries share many features that are associated with lower trust, such as 
corruption, high crime rates, and inconsistent economic performance. Based on the evaluative 
definition of trust, where government earn trust by performing well on key indicators that 
citizens care about, poor performance on these indicators should be associated with lower overall 
trust in government. Several scholars have in fact worked to establish the link between some of 
these indicators and the lower overall trust in government seen in the Latin American context. 
For example, Seligson (2002) shows that exposure to corruption in select Latin American 
countries, including Brazil, erodes beliefs in the political system and reduces interpersonal trust. 
Using an evaluative framework, this can be understood as the government failing to earn trust by 
neglecting citizen expectations for transparency and fair provision of services. High income 
inequality, which is likewise a characteristic of Brazilian society, is also associated with lower 
trust in government because high inequality violates expectations of fairness (Zmerli and Castillo 
2015). This is also consistent with the evaluative definition of trust associated with government 
performance, where citizens do not extend trust because the government does not conform with 
expectations of fairness. Brazil performs poorly on several of the evaluative criteria determined 
to influence trust in government, which if the existing arguments for trust variation applied in 
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low-trust environments, could explain Brazil’s low trust levels. It thus stands to reason that the 
arguments made for variations in trust in higher-trust countries, might also apply to low-trust 
countries like Brazil.  
 Thus, while the conditions in Latin America do not violate our understanding of trust 
from the existing literature, there has been little probing to understand the mechanisms through 
which citizens determine their level of trust in government in low-trust countries. In other words, 
scholars have asserted that conditions such as continued corruption and high inequality affect 
evaluations of trust in government in Latin America, but in general fail to examine whether an 
evaluative definition of trust more broadly applies in low-trust environments. For example, the 
key indicators citizens use to evaluate governments in high-trust countries might be different 
than those used in low trust countries. Further, short term changes in government performance in 
low-trust countries might be met with more skepticism and have less of an affect than they would 
in higher-trust environments. 
Brazil, and low-trust countries more generally, thus lack a well-studied framework for 
understanding what actions are likely to build up trust in government. Despite challenges 
associated with limited information, several projects have attempted to address the metrics that 
have been linked with low trust in government. For example, as a remedy for the kind of 
pervasive corruption seen in Brazil, policy advocates often prescribe e-governance systems that 
are believed to increase transparency and foster the creation of trust. There is some evidence that 
e-governance systems do increase perceptions of responsiveness and transparency, especially at 
the local level, in the US context (Tolbert and Mossberger 2006). Brazil attempted this through 
their electoral system, which currently operates using an electronic system that enjoys 
considerable widespread trust (Avgerou, 2007). Trust in this institution warrants an investigation, 
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because if the Brazilian government is looking to increase trust, they might look to model future 
programs on a project that has done so. Although promising, Avgerou, et. al (2007) argue that 
the trust in the electronic voting system could be explained mostly through existing trust of 
information communications technology (ICT) systems and trust in the specific agencies that 
implemented the system. While this project provides evidence that an infrastructure project can 
increase trust in government, it is difficult to determine if that trust applies to the government 
more generally or just the specific agency implementing the project. It also shows that Brazil has 
the wherewithal to address issues associated with low trust, but, due to lack of research, targeted 
improvements are difficult to identify. I will contribute to this discussion by examining both 
more traditional infrastructure projects and more general trust in government rather than 
investigating views on a particular agency.  
1.1.4 Changing Beliefs About Trust 
In addition to targeting specific metrics that are linked to trust in particular government 
institutions, governments also seek to improve trust by changing citizens’ overall perceptions of 
government and beliefs about the government’s trustworthiness. In countries with a low-trust 
baseline, this might be particularly important to ensure that successful projects are associated 
with increases in trust across the government rather than the specific department that 
implemented the project. Governments might thus be interested in understanding how beliefs are 
formed and updated, as they are looking to change their citizens’ beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of the government.  
The literature on belief formation and updating is extensive and complex. Traditionally, 
scholars argued that when making judgements, people acted as rational agents that conducted full 
cost benefit analyses, but Tversky and Kahneman (1974) highlighted that judgements made 
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under uncertainty are subject to a handful of heuristics that people use to form and update 
beliefs. These heuristics are especially useful when cost-benefit analyses are difficult or 
impossible to conduct in their entirety. Heuristics, in this context, are mental shortcuts people 
make to ease the burden of a decision made under uncertainty. The three heuristics introduced by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) are representativeness, availability, and anchor and adjustment. 
Representativeness is an attempt to make a decision based on how representative of a category 
something is. For example, in their paper, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) show that people 
assess that someone who is quiet is more likely to be associated with professions such as 
accounting. The availability heuristic is a judgment based on how many examples of a 
phenomenon someone can remember, where being able to remember more examples makes the 
phenomenon seem more likely. Finally, anchor and adjustment occurs if, when presented with an 
anchor, people use that value as a sort of starting point in making a judgement and adjust their 
decision around the anchor value until they arrive at what they consider a plausible value 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Several other heuristics were identified by later researchers and 
include well-researched phenomena such as confirmation bias, but this paper is concerned 
primarily with the availability and anchor and adjust heuristics. These heuristics could help 
explain how citizens make decisions about their interactions with the government, given that in 
low-trust environments citizens cannot be sure they can trust their government to follow through 
on their promises and are thus operating with uncertainty.  
Scholars have studied these heuristics in a political science context by applying them to 
voting behavior and beliefs about policies among other domains. For example, researchers have 
shown that the anchor and adjust heuristic influences how voters perceive and vote on local bond 
referenda. If the referendum includes the total (usually quite large) amount of the bond, a larger 
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share of the voters vote against the bond. This is because the total amount introduces an 
arbitrarily high anchor and voters, while adjusting down to what they consider a plausible cost to 
themselves, estimate their individual cost as higher than it actually is. However, if the bond is 
introduced as a monthly property tax increase and lacks the large total amount, this effect is 
absent (Hall 2014).  
Heuristics and belief updating psychology are also commonly applied to beliefs about 
climate change. For example, in farming communities, agricultural advisors in the Midwestern 
United States that perceived more variations in weather were more likely to support farming 
practices that promoted climate resiliency (Mase, et al. 2015). This is consistent with the 
availability heuristic, as recall of more unusual weather events provides anecdotal support for 
climate change in individual farming communities. Further, Deryugina (2013), who also 
examines the effect of temperature variations on beliefs about climate change, found evidence 
that weather events that conform with expectations about climate change are significant 
predictors of affirmative belief in climate change. The author also explicitly investigated belief 
update heuristics and found support for the availability and representativeness heuristics 
(Deryugina 2013). These heuristics could also apply to creating and updating beliefs about trust 
in government. In particular, when evaluating the government’s trustworthiness, citizens might 
be influenced by the availability and the anchor and adjust heuristics. This implication is 
explored further in the next section of this paper. 
More broadly, the literature on changing beliefs in a political context also seeks to 
understand how beliefs change regarding deeply held political notions. One example, again 
involving climate change beliefs, showed that for university students, educational travel which 
exposed students to environmental issues first-hand led to increased beliefs in climate change 
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and support for preventative policies (Landon, et al. 2019). Another example shows stereotypes 
that European Americans’ have about African Americans, which are deeply held and often long-
term, can be somewhat altered by hearing alternative opinions from in-group members (Stangor, 
et al. 2001). A common theme in much of this literature is that changing beliefs requires some 
exposure to the opposing side of an issue, which is challenging to enforce on a larger scale. 
Governments are uniquely positioned to be able to enforce exposure on such a larger scale 
because they are able to conduct programs throughout an entire country. Thus, to change beliefs 
about their own trustworthiness, there is potential for a government to show its trustworthiness at 
a national scale, whereas other entities trying to change beliefs may be unable to operate at this 
scope. Overall, however, changing deeply held political beliefs is a challenging undertaking. 
Further, the literature lacks clarity on how people change beliefs not simply about particular 
political issues, but about their relationship with the government itself. Thus, governments that 
suffer from low citizen trust know little about how to change their citizens’ beliefs about the 
government’s trustworthiness. As such, this paper attempts to explore one-way governments may 
be able to address this challenge. Consequently, in this paper I contribute to the literature by both 
exploring models of trust in a low trust environment and attempting to uncover a mechanism via 
which governments may improve this trust.  
1.1.5 Infrastructure Development 
The mechanism I examine for improving trust is providing good economic stewardship 
via infrastructure development. I suppose that infrastructure development, as a uniquely visible 
example of government action and, as other scholarship has shown (Calderón and Servén 2004; 
Pereira, et al. 2010), a mechanism for economic development, has a potential for improving 
government trust. The direct link between infrastructure development and trust in government is 
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generally understudied as most research is focused whether infrastructure development is 
associated with economic development. This paper goes further by examining a more direct link 
than previous papers between infrastructure development and trust in government; in particular, 
it tests whether infrastructure development, by introducing the mechanism of economic 
development, can also increase trust in government. The literature daisy chains infrastructure 
development, economic improvement, and trust in government by showing a direct link between 
infrastructure development and economic improvements and another direct link between 
economic improvements and trust in government. However, the literature lacks a direct 
examination of the effects of infrastructure development on trust in government.  
First, the link between economic development and trust in government has been 
established by Chanley, et al. (2000), among others, who document how good economic 
stewardship and perceptions of government economic management are directly linked to citizen 
trust in government (Chanley, et al. 2000). Second, there is also ample evidence in the literature 
that infrastructure improves economic outcomes and represents the kind of good economic 
stewardship that has been shown to increase trust in government. In Latin America in particular, 
infrastructure development projects have increased economic development and decreased 
inequality. For example, road and sanitation access in the country has contributed to income 
convergence in the poorest regions of Brazil (Calderón and Servén 2004). This potentially 
lessens the impact of income inequality, which is negatively associated with trust in government, 
and strengthens trust in government through the known mechanism of economic development. 
Further, most research on infrastructure and economic development in Brazil focuses on the 
electrification of rural Brazil, which is made difficult by the inaccessibility and sparse population 
density of some regions of the country. Electrification efforts have proven to be largely 
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successful at reducing energy poverty and improving economic conditions (Pereira, et al. 2010). 
Again, this paper tests whether these improving economic conditions are directly linked to 
improved evaluative perceptions of government. If governments can accomplish dual goals – 
economic development and trust in government – by completing infrastructure projects, 
governments will be able to govern better due to both increased available funding and a 
friendlier environment for public policies.  
1.2 Theory 
As outlined above, the evaluative definition of trust is that a citizen trusts their 
government when they believe that the government has the “integrity and capacity to meet the 
voter’s expectations” (Keele 2007). In this framework, Brazil’s low trust in government can be 
attributed to citizens negatively perceiving characteristics of the government’s performance such 
as economic stewardship and corruption. These negative perceptions of the government are 
developed by repeated interactions with the government in which the government’s performance 
is lacking. Each negative interaction further reduces trust in government, culminating in low 
overall levels of trust. This framework of evaluative trust, which was developed in high-trust 
environments, has been assumed to apply to low-trust countries like Brazil. This paper will 
therefore examine this framework within Brazil to test if it holds in a low-trust country. 
 The successful completion of an infrastructure project should represent a positive 
interaction with the government that counteracts some of the other negative interactions. 
Assuming the project itself is not tainted by allegations of corruption or mismanagement, a 
completed infrastructure project showcases several positive features of governments. For 
example, it shows capacity to plan, pay for, and complete a large-scale project, ability to improve 
baseline conditions for economic development, and an understanding of citizen needs. 
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Infrastructure development projects are also a uniquely visible government action. Completed 
projects are known not only to direct recipients, but also nearby citizens. They are sometimes 
even reported on at a national level, as is the case with major new roads. When citizens see a 
successfully completed project, it should factor in to their evaluation of government and increase 
their level of trust. This expectation should have an even greater effect if the project has a direct 
impact on the citizen. 
Because the nature of evaluations of trust is that they’re cumulative, repeated exposure to 
new infrastructure should have a larger effect than if a citizen has a one-off exposure. For 
example, if an infrastructure project positively impacts someone directly, and then later 
positively impacts their neighbor, and then later again positively impacts a member of their 
family, it should have a greater effect than if the project only impacted themselves. Thus, 
consistent with the availability belief formation heuristics, communities that have a larger share 
of the population benefitting from a project should have greater improvements in their trust in 
government.  
H1: If a larger share of a community is positively impacted by an infrastructure project, 
then the community will exhibit greater increases in trust in government compared with 
communities that have a smaller share of people impacted. 
In addition to repeated exposures in self-contained communities, seeing positive impacts 
in nearby communities as well should also lead to increased trust. In fact, it should inspire further 
confidence than if the recipients were limited to one community. This is because seeing positive 
impacts in nearby communities as well shows that the project is larger in scale. So further 
increases in trust come both from more exposure, and thus more points to factor in to the 
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availability heuristic, but also demonstrating that the project is larger and more complex and thus 
more impressive to manage well.  
H2: If nearby communities are also positively impacted by an infrastructure project, then 
the community will exhibit even greater increases in trust in government.  
However, citizens do not reevaluate their level of trust in government entirely with each 
new interaction. Instead, modifications to their beliefs are incremental, where the most recent 
several interactions matter more than past interactions. This is consistent with the anchor and 
adjust belief formation heuristic introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Because the 
completion of infrastructure projects does not represent an ongoing interaction with the 
government, and maintenance of infrastructure projects is often less visible than their initial 
installation, I expect this positive effect on evaluative performance to decrease over time.  
H3: As time passes with no new exposure to completed pieces of infrastructure, the 
initial gains in trust in government will diminish over time.  
 If these hypotheses are supported by the evidence, then this would be evidence that the 
evaluative framework outlined above can be applied in low-trust countries like Brazil. If this is 
the case, infrastructure development could be a tool that low-trust countries can use to improve 





2. DATA AND METHODS 
2.1 Measuring Trust 
Surveys of trust are typically conducted at a national level. While this aggregation is 
valuable for comparing outcomes between countries or in a single country over time, it is less 
useful for studying the determinants of trust within a country over a shorter time period. 
Infrastructure development projects are normally limited to a single country over a span of a few 
years at the most. Further, their impact is often more localized, making national level surveys 
less useful for capturing the impact of infrastructure projects on trust. These conditions make it 
necessary to seek a more localized measure of trust than existing surveys provide.  
The measure I use to capture trust must align with the evaluative definition of trust that 
Keele (2007) articulates, which defines trust as a belief that the government has the capability to 
meet voter expectations. This definition aligns with the transactional nature of trust that serves as 
the underpinning for my theoretical arguments. I propose that citizens will evaluate the 
government’s execution of infrastructure projects and come to a conclusion about whether the 
government is capable of meeting their expectations. Because these infrastructure projects have 
differential impact based on where they are implemented, the indicator I use to measure trust 
must be reliably and consistently available at a subnational level. To my knowledge, no such 
survey data exist. 
Rather than asking people directly to report their level of trust in government, I instead 
measure behaviors that are associated with trust in government. For example, Levi and Stoker 
(2000) review the existing literature to determine that certain citizen behaviors such as tax and 
regulation compliance, particular voting behaviors, and citizen participation are associated with 
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trust in government. The higher level of government trust, the more likely people are to exhibit 
these behaviors. Of particular importance in this paper is voting behavior because electoral data 
is consistently and reliably available at the municipal level in Brazil. Brazil’s electronic voting 
system ensures relative accuracy and breadth of the type of information available (Avgerou, et al. 
2007). 
Given the breadth of information available about Brazilian electoral results and 
behaviors, there are a variety of options for selecting the behavior most closely associated with 
trust. For example, in the US context, lower levels of trust are linked with less support for 
incumbents, which manifests in increased support for third-party or Independent candidates, 
especially when those candidates express anti-establishment sentiments (Levi and Stoker 2000). 
While some evidence of this phenomenon exists in Brazil, as the case of frustration with 
corruption leading to increased support for anti-establishment candidate Jair Bolsonaro in the 
2018 presidential election shows (Hunter and Power 2019), Brazil’s fragmented party systems 
prevents clear and consistent identification of parties or candidates as anti-establishment. A 
further issue with applying this measure to the Brazilian context is that many of these fragmented 
parties are clientelist (Gonzalez-Ocantos and Oliveros 2019). This would pose problems for 
measuring the impact of infrastructure development on voting behavior because infrastructure 
projects that reduce vulnerability among the poor have been demonstrated to reduce voting for 
clientelist incumbents (Bobonis, et al. 2017). This behavior makes using support for anti-
establishment non-incumbents as a measure of trust problematic because reduced reliance on 




A solution to this classification issue comes again from the US context, where 
perceptions of increasing corruption left citizens with less confidence that the government could 
solve their problems, which was then associated with a lower voter turnout (Caillier 2010). In 
this way, trust in the ability of governments to solve problems was thus linked with voter turnout. 
In the Brazilian context voting is mandatory, and while penalties for noncompliance are low, this 
mandatory aspect complicates the use of voter turnout as a measure of trust in government. 
However, one option Brazilian citizens have that replicates aspects of both the anti-establishment 
vote and the decision to stay home rather than vote is the ability to cast a blank or null ballot, 
where citizens explicitly choose none of the available candidates.  
The difference between a null and a blank ballot is largely a technicality. A null ballot is 
a ballot that is filled out incorrectly, thus invalidating the vote, whereas a blank ballot fails to 
include a vote for any of the available candidates (Nicolau 2015). Further, interviews have 
shown that people will cast blank and null ballots to communicate frustration (Saccone 2018). 
For this paper, I exclude null ballots and instead exclusively use rates of blank ballots. While 
combining these ballot classifications would have been preferable, the data for null ballots were 
noisier and had enough missing entries that its inclusion muddied rather than clarified my 
analysis. Thus, the measure I ultimately use is the percentage of votes that are blank for each 
race in each municipality for every year under consideration. Brazil’s electoral system is 
characterized by high rates of blank and invalid voting as well as abstention, despite mandatory 
voting laws. Thus, there is noteworthy variation in the percentage of blank ballots by year, 
municipality, and office up for election. I also chose to exclude rates of abstention for my main 
analysis because certain socioeconomic factors could complicate an individual’s decision to stay 
home that are less applicable to blank or votes. For example, I suspected that difficulty getting to 
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poll, lack of information about when and where elections would take place, and similar 
circumstances would affect the rate of abstention to a larger degree than the rate of blank votes, 
given that if a blank vote is cast, it can be assumed that that person had overcome those 
obstacles. I do, however, consider abstention rates as a robustness check in a secondary analysis.   
2.2 Measuring Infrastructure Development 
The infrastructure project I am using to test my hypotheses is the Luz para Todos 
program. The program is an effort spearheaded by the national government to achieve universal 
electrification in Brazil. The 2000 census revealed that 13 million people lacked electricity, 
mostly in rural and isolated areas, which were targeted by the program. Where implemented, the 
Luz para Todos was shown to create improvements in every component of the Human 
Development Index – health, education, and living standards (da Silveira Bezerra, et al. 2017). It 
also showed success at spurring economic development in the regions where it was implemented 
(Pereira, et al. 2010). Further, Luz para Todos has not suffered accusations of corruption or 
mismanagement. Ultimately, the available evidence points to interactions with the Luz para 
Todos program as an example of a positive interaction with government that generally leads to 
good outcomes. Finally, while Luz para Todos is a federal program, it is coordinated with local 
officials to identify households in the community in need and uses for the electric power they 
would receive, meaning that the program represents an interaction with multiple levels of 
government. Given these features and the fact that the data from the program is available at a 
municipal level, it seemed particularly suitable to this analysis. 
2.3 Data 
To measure rates of blank voting, I collected electoral data from the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics between 2002 and 2018. For each year, I calculate the percentage of 
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total votes cast in each municipality that were blank. Elections cycles in Brazil are two years 
long, with the elections taking place in the final quarter of the year. Election cycles alternate 
between two types of races. In 2002, the offices up for election were Governor and State Deputy, 
which are state level offices, and Senator and Federal Deputy, which are federal level offices. In 
2004, two local offices – Mayor and City Counselor – were up for election. The subsequent years 
cycle between these two sets of offices.  
To measure recipient rates of infrastructure at the same level of the electoral data, the 
municipal level, I use the data published from the Luz para Todos program, which are recorded 
as the number of recipient households per municipality in a calendar year. First, I sum the total 
number of households that received electricity through the program for each election cycle. 
Then, using data from the 2000 census on the total number of households in a municipality and 
the number of those that had electricity, I establish the initial percentage of households in the 
municipality that had electricity. I then calculate the percent improvement brought about by the 
Luz para Todos program over the course of each election cycle. This requires determining the 
percent of the households that had electricity at the start and end of each election cycle and then 
using the standard calculation for improvement percent. This method has an important advantage 
of simply taking the percent of households that received electricity through the program in that 
election cycle.  
My expectation is that there is a difference in the impact of the program in municipalities 
that largely lacked electricity versus municipalities that had almost complete electrification. For 
example, consider two municipalities: Municipality A has only a 5% electrification rate and 
Municipality B has a 95% rate. Suppose that as a result of the program, Municipality A ends an 
election cycle with a 10% rate and Municipality B ends the same election cycle with a 100% 
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rate. Both municipalities had 5% of their households receive electricity, but Municipality A has a 
100% improvement and Municipality B has only a 5.26% improvement. In this way, 
municipalities with smaller original rates of electrification have greater percent increases for the 
same percentage of households receiving services. This captures the different realities and levels 
of need in the different municipalities. Residents of Municipality A would be more likely to 
notice the program and the community would receive more benefit than that of Municipality B. 
The percent improvement conversion captures this. 
When developing possibly confounding variables, I noted that political explanations are 
not the only explanations for the rates of blank and voting in Latin America. Generally, 
explanations for these high rates of legal nonparticipation fall into three categories – institutional 
attributes of the electoral system, socioeconomic contexts, and political factors (Power and 
Garand 2007). Institutional attributes include features of the system that make voting more 
difficult. For example, Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies is elected via open list proportional 
representation, which places a high burden on the voter to select candidates from among lists that 
occasionally number in the hundreds of candidates. Socioeconomic contexts, such as literacy 
rates, influence the ability of an individual to understand how to follow correct voting procedures 
and to gain information about the candidates. Finally, political factors capture discontent and 
frustration with the political system (Power and Garand 2007). Each of these factors influence 
rates of invalid and blank voting in Brazil (Power and Roberts 1995).  
 In order to isolate political motivations for casting blank and invalid votes such as trust or 
disappointment with government, I have collected control variables that account for institutional 
and socioeconomic factors. I collected municipal-level data from the 2010 census, which is the 
closest available census to the years of my analysis. Variables for literacy rates and urbanization 
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control for socioeconomic factors. Each of these factors could affect the ability of an individual 
to correctly fill out a ballot, make an informed choice, or have any connection to the political 
system. They also measure some amount of political connectedness, which is also related to how 
many households are recipients of an infrastructure project.  
To control for institutional factors, I take into account the specific position up for election 
as well as the year of the election. Citizens might hold certain positions more accountable for 
infrastructure projects and offices routinely have different rates of blank voting. For example, 
city councilors average blank voting rates of 1.49% while senators average 12.18%. As such, I 
have grouped races into federal, state, and local types and included these types as a control 
variable. Finally, I created a dummy variable for whether the year was 2014 in order to exclude a 
national event unrelated to infrastructure development that influenced trust in government. In 
2013, Brazil experienced massive anti-corruption protests, which demonstrated widespread 
dissatisfaction with politics in Brazil. While these protests and their fallout certainly had an 
effect on trust in government, they are largely unrelated to the particular relationship I am trying 
to measure.  
  After collecting variables from the 2000 and 2010 censuses, program data from the Luz 
para Todos program, and electoral data for the duration of the Luz para Todos program, this 
analysis contained more than 145,000 entries. This number resulted from the nearly 6,000 
municipalities for which I was able to collect data, the eight years of electoral data, and the 
several offices up for election in each of those years in each municipality.  
2.4 Empirical Strategy 




Blank Voting = F(Blank Votingt-1 + Electrification Improvementt + 
Electrification Improvementt-1  + Nearby Averaget + Electrification 




• where Blank Voting is the rate of blank voting in a particular municipality, race, 
and election cycle, 
• Blank Votingt-1 is the rate of blank voting in a particular municipality and race for 
the previous election cycle, 
• Electrification Improvementt is the percent improvement in electrification in a 
particular municipality during the current election cycle, 
• Electrification Improvementt-1 is the percent improvement in electrification in a 
particular municipality during the previous election cycle, 
• Nearby Averaget is the average percent improvement in electrification for 
municipalities within 50 kilometers in any cardinal direction for the particular 
municipality and election cycle,  
• Electrification Improvementt*Urbanizationt is a multiplicative interaction 
between the percent improvement in electrification in a particular municipality 
and election cycle and the rate of urbanization of that municipality,  
• Control Variablest is a vector of control variables for the particular municipality 
and race during the current election cycle,  
• And Errort is the stochastic component for the particular municipality, race, and 
election cycle.  
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The Blank Votingt-1 term is included because my theory supposes that the infrastructure 
project will produce a change, and the lagged term will allow me to control for the usual level of 
blank voting in a municipality. The Electrification Improvementt term is the main independent 
variable, and will be used to test H1, that an increase in this improvement rate will correspond 
with a decrease in blank voting (through the mechanism of increased trust). The lagged term, 
Electrification Improvementt-1, is used to test H3, that the effects of infrastructure development 
on increased trust will decrease over time. By comparing this term with the term from the current 
election cycle, I will be able to compare the effects of infrastructure development over time.  
The Nearby Averaget term is used to test H2, that higher rates of electrification 
improvements in nearby municipalities should further decrease blank voting rates. The term is 
calculated by identifying municipalities that are within a box that extends 50 kilometers east, 
west, north, and south of the municipality in question. The electrification improvement rates of 
these municipalities from the current election cycle are then averaged. Boxes with 25 kilometer 
and 100 kilometer ranges were tested and returned similar results. 
Finally, the interaction term, Electrification Improvementt*Urbanizationt, is necessary 
because the Luz Para Todos program explicitly targets rural municipalities. Most municipalities 
that had electrification needs were in rural and isolated areas, so more program resources were 





3.1 Results of Main Model Specification 
Utilizing all available data on the model specification in Equation 2.1 yields Table 3.1 
below.  
Table 3.1: Regression Results of Main Model Specification 






















Race Level: Local 
-5.001*** 
(0.036) 



















Adjusted R2 0.551 




         *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p< 0.01 
Because of the interaction term, it is difficult to interpret the coefficient or significance of 
the main independent variable – Electrification Improvement – directly. Instead, Figure 3.1 gives 
the interaction graph for this model. The interaction graph shows the predicted rate of Blank 
Voting for a given level of Electrification Improvement, subdivided by the type of municipality.  
The red line at the top represents rural municipalities, the blue line in the middle represents semi-
urban municipalities, and the green line at the bottom represents urban municipalities. The slopes 
of these lines show the changes in predicted rates of Blank Voting as Electrification Improvement 
increases. Further, the shaded areas around the line show the 95% confidence interval on the 
predictions. Finally, it is important to note that as Electrification Improvement increases to the 
highest rates, some types of municipalities are predicted to have negative Blank Voting rates. 
This is of course impossible. However, these extreme predictions are a result of the type of data 
available. Because rural municipalities were targeted, the highest rates of Electrification 
Improvement are exclusively in rural municipalities. In fact, urban municipalities rarely achieve 
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more than even a 5% improvement because they were not targeted for this program and because 
of their larger size. Thus, when Electrification Improvement reaches nearly 600%, these 
predictions are more speculative and less meaningful for urban municipalities than they are for 
rural municipalities.  
Figure 3.1: Interaction between Urbanization of a Municipality and Electrification Improvement 
3.2 Evaluating the Hypotheses 
H1: If a larger share of a community is positively impacted by an infrastructure project, 
then the community will exhibit greater increases in trust in government compared with 
communities that have a smaller share of people impacted. 
 Using Figure 3.1, a negative slope would indicate support for H1. This is because a 
negative slope means that as Electrification Improvement increases, the predicted rate of Blank 
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Voting decreases. As demonstrated in Figure 3.1, all municipalities demonstrate a negative slope, 
which is supportive of H1. However, while the semi-urban and urban municipalities have a more 
pronounced negative slope, the slope for rural municipalities is much smaller. In fact, the range 
of values in the confidence interval around the slope never depart from the predicted value when 
Electrification Improvement is zero. In effect, this means that support for H1 for rural 
municipalities is not statistically significant.  
H2: If nearby communities are also positively impacted by an infrastructure project, then 
the community will exhibit even greater increases in trust in government. 
 H2 can be more readily interpreted from the regression table in Table 3.1. The Nearby 
Average term has a negative and statistically significant negative coefficient. This means that as 
the electrification improvement increases in nearby municipalities, the rate of blank voting is 
further depressed. In particular, with a ten percent increase in the electrification improvement of 
nearby municipalities, blank voting decreases from the previous election cycle by 0.18 
percentage points.  
H3: As time passes with no new exposure to completed pieces of infrastructure, the 
initial gains in trust in government will diminish over time.  
 Some aspects of H3 can also be readily interpreted from the regression table in Table 3.1. 
While the coefficient on the Electrification Improvementt-1 term is negative and statistically 
significant, it is one of the least significant values in the model. Although the coefficient and 
significance level are not easy to compare directly between the current time and the previous 
time, Figure 3.2 shows another interaction graph, this time plotting the effect of the 
Electrification Improvementt-1 on the rates of Blank Voting. The slopes are much smaller and the 
confidence interval is wider. The relatively high confidence interval and small slope are both 
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support for the diminishing effect of electrification improvement over time. Because election 
cycles are two years, some of the improvements in the Electrification Improvementt-1 variable 
occurred nearly four years prior to the current election, which is ample time for other 
government interactions to supersede a positive interaction with Luz para Todos.  
Figure 3.2: Interaction between Urbanization of a Municipality and Lagged Electrification Improvement 
 Thus, the initial model provides support for all three hypotheses. This provides at least 
some evidence that governments have routes to improve government trust and therefore 
institutional performance without an existing base of strong social capital. In contrast to the 
social capital argument, these results show that some degree of increases in citizen trust in 
government is possible in the short term through government actions. Therefore, some evidence 
exists for an evaluative framework of trust in a low-trust environment.  
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One puzzle in the results is the differing effect of the Luz para Todos program on 
municipalities of different levels of urbanization. Because most households that required 
electricity were rural, it seemed that the effect of Electrification Improvement should have been 
strongest for rural municipalities, but in fact it is strongest for urban municipalities and the effect 
on rural municipalities is not statistically significant. Some confounding factors for rural 
municipalities might exist that are not present for other types of municipalities. For example, 
rural municipalities experience higher rates of clientelism than urban municipalities, which might 
undermine the expected relationship (Koster and Eiró 2021). Alternatively, rural municipalities, 
especially in Northeastern states, often have more acute needs than urban municipalities, making 
the Luz para Todos program insufficient to address those needs (Rocha, et al. 2019). Repeated 
failures of government to assist poor rural municipalities might not be overcome by one 
successful program. This question is explored further in an alternative model specification.  
3.3 Alternative Model Specifications 
In order to further examine the relationship between urbanization and the effect of 
electrification improvement on blank voting rates, I subdivided the dataset into rural, semi-urban, 
and urban municipalities. Table 3.2 below shows the regression results of the models.  













































































N 7,546 37,312 45,184 
R2 0.519 0.532 0.556 
Adjusted R2 0.519 0.532 0.556 








*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p< 0.01 
Because the data has already been subdivided, there is no need for an interaction term in 
these models, so the hypotheses can be directly checked using coefficients from the regression 
tables. When looking at only rural municipalities, the Electrification Improvement term has a 
statistically significant negative coefficient. This is supportive of H1 because it indicates that an 
increase in Electrification Improvement is associated with a decrease in Blank Voting rates. 
Further, H3 is supported because the Electrification Improvementt-1 term is also negative, but not 
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statistically significant and has a smaller coefficient than the term from the current period. 
Finally, H2 is not supported because while the Nearby Average term is also negative, it is not 
statistically significant. This could be because rural municipalities are further apart and more 
dispersed, lessening the effect of nearby municipalities. While H1 is not supported for rural 
municipalities when examining all municipalities together, it is possible that the main model is 
not able to capture the various aspects of rural municipalities that are unique. Examining only 
rural municipalities allows for the restricted model to control for the confluence of unique 
circumstances such as lower education, higher rates of clientelism, and lower monthly earnings 
that characterize regions that were targeted by the Luz Para Todos program.  
 Semi-urban and urban municipalities show results consistent with the main model. 
Further, as shown in Table 3.2, semi-urban municipalities have a larger negative coefficient for 
Electrification Improvement than rural municipalities and urban municipalities have a larger 
negative coefficient than semi-urban municipalities. This is consistent with the more pronounced 
negative slopes as urbanization increases, as seen in Figure 3.1.  
3.4 Turnout as a Measure of Trust 
As discussed above, blank voting rates seemed the closest measure that would correspond 
to trust among the electoral behaviors I considered. Voting is mandatory in Brazil, which could 
potentially complicate the link between voter turnout and trust in government that is established 
in the literature. However, penalties for abstention are low in Brazil. As such, I include a 
secondary analysis using turnout rates rather than blank voting rates as a measure of trust. The 
model specifications are otherwise the same; however, because trust is associated with increased 
turnout (as opposed to decreases in blank voting), the expected coefficients are positive rather 
than negative. The results of the regression are presented below in Table 3.3. Like the blank 
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voting model above, I included an interaction term between the electrification improvement and 
urbanization variables and as such include an interaction graph in Figure 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Regression Results of Turnout Rate 






















Race Level: Local 
1.661*** 
(0.038) 


















Adjusted R2 0.656 




         *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p< 0.01 
           Figure 3.3: Interaction between Urbanization of a Municipality and Electrification Improvement 
Interestingly, the only municipalities that have the expected relationship are urban 
municipalities. Rural and semi-urban municipalities exhibit a relationship in the opposite of the 
expected direction. This gives very limited support for H1, as both rural and semi-urban 
municipalities contradict expectations. Further, the nearby variable used for testing H2 and the 
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lagged independent variable used for testing H3 are both negative and statistically significant. 
Thus, neither H2 nor H3 are supported using this alternative measure of trust. In fact, a 
statistically significant relationship exists in the opposite expected direction for nearly all 
indicators for all three hypotheses, with only urban municipalities for H1 exhibiting support. The 
contradictory results between blank voting and voter turnout as measures of trust are explored 





An important consideration throughout this project has been that measuring electoral 
behaviors as a proxy for trust in government is not a direct method of measuring trust. A further 
complicating factor is that electoral behaviors that are associated with trust have mostly been 
studied in the United States and Western European democracies. As such, the measures I have 
used in this project are indirect and have factors that could obscure the relationship I am 
attempting to uncover. In this section, I will attempt to explain why the results may be different 
when I use blank voting rather than turnout to measure trust.  
 One of the most significant complicating factors when using electoral behaviors to 
measure trust in Brazil is clientelism. Clientelism occurs more frequently in Brazil compared to 
much of the rest of Latin America, with over 20% of survey respondents reporting it to 
AmericasBarometer, an international survey about attitudes and beliefs in Latin America 
(Gonzalez-Ocantos and Oliveros 2019). Clientelism could be a possible explanation for the 
divergence between some of my theoretical expectations and the results I found.  
 In clientelist relationships, voters enter into a relationship with candidates where the voter 
expects access to goods and services in exchange for their vote. Clientelism undermines 
traditional democratic expression and is usually targeted and poorer and more vulnerable voters 
(Rocha, et al. 2019). Thus, in the same places the Luz Para Todos program is targeted, 
clientelism is more frequent. Programs that reduce vulnerability of poor voters, which Luz Para 
Todos does, also reduce clientelism voting practices (Bobonis, et al. 2017). Following the 
improvement in electrification in municipalities, I would then expect to see a reduction in 
clientelist voting practices. 
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 This could explain why rural municipalities did not have statistically significant 
decreases in blank voting compared with urban and semi-urban municipalities when all 
municipalities were tested together. If the blank voting rate was artificially low before the Luz 
Para Todos program because more individual voters were allying themselves with a clientelist 
candidate, then a possible increase in trust would be masked when measured with rates of blank 
voting. There is some evidence that blank voting was artificially lower as the rate of blank voting 
was noticeably lower for local candidates, which are more likely to participate in clientelist 
practices compared with higher level candidates (Rocha, et al. 2019). After the Luz Para Todos 
program was implemented, I would expect rural voters to have less need to support clientelist 
candidates and have more freedom to vote as they wished. Thus, the results are actually biased in 
favor of not finding a relationship for rural voters. Because the model that was restricted to just 
rural municipalities found a relationship, I can be more confident that the relationship exists.  
 Clientelism could also be an explanation for why rural and semi-urban municipalities 
exhibited decreases rather than increases in voter turnout when electrification improvement 
increased. When ballots are secret, as Brazil’s are, clientelist candidates can only observe 
whether or not an individual votes and cannot see what their vote is. If the vulnerability of poor 
voters is reduced through the Luz Para Todos program, then they have less need to support 
clientelist candidates. As such, their decision on whether or not to vote might be altered to prefer 
not voting if they are not relying on goods and services from a clientelist candidate. Thus, voter 
turnout might decrease despite increased trust in government because voter turnout could have 
been artificially high prior to the Luz Para Todos program.  
 Clientelism can also influence voter turnout through the mechanism of vote buying. 
Some clientelist candidates engage in a type of election fraud where individual voters are 
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encouraged to transfer their electoral registration to a new district and support the clientelist 
candidate in the new district. These candidates affect voter turnout by inducing more voters from 
nearby districts to enter into the electorate in favor of the candidate (Hidalgo and Nichter 2016). 
Thus, some smaller areas actually have an inflow of voters because of this practice, which would 
result in artificially high rates of voter turnout. Programs that reduce clientelist practices actually 
decreased the size of the electorate in municipalities where this was occurring (Hidalgo and 
Nichter 2016). Thus, if the Luz Para Todos program reduces clientelist practices, a decrease in 
voter turnout would occur, which could mask an increase in trust.  
 If clientelism is the reason that some outcomes are contrary to expectations, then it would 
make sense that voter turnout was more effected than blank voting rates. Brazil has a secret 
ballot, so clientelist candidates can only monitor whether or not someone voted. Because turnout 
is the metric that candidates can monitor, it would be more affected by clientelist voting 
behaviors.  
 This results in this project could be supported or refuted with additional research. For 
example, in order to untangle the relationship between voting behavior and trust in government, 
future studies could examine how clientelism and trust in government interact to influence voting 
behavior. This work could verify how justifiable using electoral behaviors as indicators of trust 
ultimately is. Further, qualitative information like interviews with Luz Para Todos recipients 
could either reinforce or refute my theoretical arguments. Understanding how recipients 
perceived the program and the government’s involvement in it could shed further light on the 






Support for my theoretical arguments is mixed and more research is necessary to 
untangle the relationship between infrastructure development and citizen trust in government. 
When using blank voting rates as a measure of trust in government, my hypotheses are largely 
supported; however, that support vanishes when using turnout rates as a proxy for citizen trust in 
government. One explanation for the inconsistency between these results is clientelism, which 
distorts the relationship between citizen trust and preferences and their electoral behavior. 
 Further research could clarify this relationship by collecting qualitative data, such as 
interviews with recipients of the Luz Para Todos program. Future researchers could also 
incorporate measures of clientelism in order to understand its effect on electoral behavior and 
trust in government.  
 It is clear that the transactive nature of trust in government that serves as the theoretical 
underpinnings for my arguments must be refined to some degree in order to apply to low trust 
environments. The mixed results in this paper show that more research is necessary in order to 
understand in what conditions a transactive understanding of trust in government applies and in 
what conditions a more nuanced approach is necessary. Scholarship on trust in government has 
matured considerably over the past few decades in countries such as the United States. It is my 
hope that this paper is part of a growing body of literature on trust in government in low trust 
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